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Abstract
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have become a power-
ful tool for a wide range of problems. Yet recent work has
shown an increasing variety of adversarial samples that can
fool them. Most existing detection mechanisms impose sig-
nificant costs, either by using additional classifiers to spot
adversarial samples, or by requiring the DNN to be restruc-
tured. In this paper, we introduce a novel defence. We train
our DNN so that, as long as it is working as intended on the
kind of inputs we expect, its behavior is constrained, in that
a set of behaviors are taboo. If it is exposed to adversar-
ial samples, they will often cause a taboo behavior, which
we can detect. As an analogy, we can imagine that we are
teaching our robot good manners; if it’s ever rude, we know
it’s come under some bad influence. This defence mech-
anism is very simple and, although it involves a modest in-
crease in training, has almost zero computation overhead at
runtime – making it particularly suitable for use in embed-
ded systems. Taboos can be both subtle and diverse. Just as
humans’ choice of language can convey a lot of information
about location, affiliation, class and much else that can be
opaque to outsiders but that enables members of the same
group to recognise each other, so also taboo choice can en-
code and hide information. We can use this to make adver-
sarial attacks much harder. It is a well-established design
principle that the security of a system should not depend on
the obscurity of its design, but of some variable (the key)
which can differ between implementations and be changed
as necessary. We explain how taboos can be used to equip a
classifier with just such a key, and to tune the keying mecha-
nism to adversaries of various capabilities. We evaluate the
performance of a prototype against a wide range of attacks
and show how our simple defense can work well in practice.
* These authors contributed equally.
1. Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are being built into ever
more systems because of their outstanding performance on
a wide variety of classification tasks. Applications such
as vision [11], language processing [3] and fraud detection
[21] are now using them. As these applications start to in-
clude safety-critical missions such as vehicle guidance, we
need to know whether they are reliable and secure. Un-
fortunately, recent research has discovered that surprisingly
small changes to inputs, such as images and sounds, can
cause DNNs to misclassify them. In the new field of ad-
versarial machine learning, attackers craft small perturba-
tions that are not perceptible by humans but are effective at
tricking DNNs. Such adversarial samples can pose a seri-
ous threat to a variety of systems that use machine-learning
techniques: examples range from tricking a voice or face
recognition system to break into stolen smart phones [1], to
changing road signs and street scenes so that human drivers
will interpret them one way while autonomous cars or un-
manned drones read them differently [4].
Current adversarial sample detection mechanisms have
two main approaches. The first is to build additional classi-
fiers that distinguish between clean and adversarial samples
[16, 2]. The second is to restructure or augment the origi-
nal network topology [7]. These mechanisms can detect a
range of attacks, but are not available off-the-shelf and are
not infallible. Both introduce extra design complexity and
computational cost – which can be particularly difficult to
bear in the case of IoT devices.
Here we introduce a conceptually different method of de-
tecting adversarial samples, which we call the Taboo Trap.
As in previous approaches, we detect them by observing the
behaviour of the classifiers. However, while most previous
approaches learned the expected behaviour of the classifier,
we restrict its behaviour and detect unexpected reactions
caused by adversarial samples.
This work was motivated by the observation made by
Zhao et al. that adversarial attacks are less transferable with
low-bit integer quantisation [28]. An intuitive explanation
is that when an activation representation is limited in mag-
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nitude, the adversary will struggle to over-drive activations
to cause a misclassification.
An intuitive analogy is that we train our robots to be-
have well, and if one of them is suddenly starts being rude
to us, we know it has fallen under some bad influence – as
when we educate children to be polite, and yet they have
been influenced by inappropriate words in the playground
and use them at the dinner table. By ‘inappropriate’ we
do not just mean anatomical swearwords or discriminatory
epithets; everyday vocabulary choice coveys a lot of infor-
mation about social group membership, political views and
so on [23]. (The analogy is slightly stretched, as in a DNN
we can measure not just the output but also the activations
of intermediate layers; it is as if we can detect a subverted
child not just when they speak an inappropriate word, but
even when they think one.)
To set a taboo trap, we first profile the activation values
and decide what transform function to apply on the activa-
tions. This function is then used to restrict the activations to
specific ranges based on the profiled information. We then
re-train the network and get a network where activations
adhere to the resulting limitations. Finally, we use a detec-
tion function that rings the alarm if any activation breaks a
taboo by falling outside the expected ranges. In a simple
implementation, the transform function can be simply clip-
ping activation values, which adds almost zero computation
overhead.
In this paper we make the following contributions:
• We observe that one can restrict DNN behaviour in
such a way as to facilitate detection of adversarial in-
puts.
• We evaluate the proposed detection framework using a
range of adversarial attacks and different DNNs.
• We show that the changes made to the training process
do not impair the convergence and performance of the
tested networks.
In section 2, we describe existing attack and defense
mechanisms. We describe our Taboo Trap and the experi-
mental setups in section 3 on the next page and evaluate its
performance in section 4 on page 4.
2. Related Work
Adversarial machine learning studies how an adversary
can exploit machine learning models and what can be done
to block or mitigate such attacks. This is a fast-moving field
with a rapidly-growing literature, and of necessity our sum-
mary here is somewhat telegraphic.
The seminal paper was by Szegedy et al. [24] who first
pointed out that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial samples
and that, in many cases, humans cannot distinguish between
clean and adversarial samples – the generated perturbations
are imperceptible.
That paper sparked off an arms race between adversar-
ial attack and defense. Defence mechanisms now come in
a wide variety of flavours. The earliest, adversarial train-
ing, was proposed by Szegedy et al. themselves; they no-
ticed that, when they fed adversarial samples into the train-
ing process, the classifier became more robust to them [24].
They found however that adversarial samples often transfer
between models, enabling black-box attacks where a sam-
ple trained on one model is used to attack another.
Variations on this theme were then explored, until in
2017 Tramer et al. found simple attacks that defeat the ba-
sic, single-step, version of adversarial training. One type
involves a random perturbation to escape local minima, fol-
lowed by a linearisation step; another is a black-box at-
tack [26]. They proposed ensemble adversarial training in
which a model is trained against adversarial samples gen-
erated on a variety of networks pre-trained from the same
data. They also described gradient masking as a defence
mechanism, noting that gradient-based attacks need to mea-
sure a gradient and making this hard to do accurately stops
the attacks from working [26]. Those defences, however,
were soon shown to be vulnerable to black-box attacks.
The new approach is adversarial sample detection. The
idea is that, in addition to the original neural network, an-
other mechanism is constructed to detect whether an input
image is adversarial. Conceptually, such mechanisms are
like intrusion detection systems; they provide situational
awareness, which in turn can enable a flexible defence. For
example, if one can detect that a black-box approximation
attack is underway then one can start injecting false data to
defeat it.
Metzen et al. were among the first to study adversarial
sample detection [18]. They augmented the original classi-
fier with an auxiliary network which they trained to classify
the inputs as either clean or adversarial. They evaluated this
against dynamic and static adversaries, and concluded that
it could detect adversarial samples.
Grosse et al. proposed two other approaches [7]. First,
they explored whether a statistical test could distinguish ad-
versarial from legitimate sample distribution data distribu-
tion; they found it was feasible but not efficient in practice.
Second, they found that instrumenting the network with an
additional class designed for adversarial sample detection is
able to work more reliably.
Meng and Chen focus on detecting adversarial samples
using an additional classifier [17]. Their MagNet system
typically uses two or more different detector networks and a
reformer network; the detector networks learn to distinguish
between normal and adversarial inputs by measuring their
distance from an expected manifold. The reformer network
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uses auto-encoders to move adversarial samples towards the
manifold of legitimate ones, so as to stop them fooling the
detectors. Although MagNet defeats black-box attacks, it
was found to be vulnerable to white-box attacks (where
the attacker knows the model’s parameters); but its creators
claim that using multiple different autoencoders can defeat
white-box (or at least grey-box) attacks since the defense
behaviour becomes too unpredictable. This appears to be
the first paper to invoke the concept of cryptographic diver-
sity as a defence.
Lu et al. presented SafetyNet – another way of instru-
menting a classifier with a adversarial sample detector [16].
It replaces the last layers of the classifier with a quantised
ReLU activation function and uses an RBF-based SVM to
classify the activation patterns. They found that this allows
them to detect adversarial samples reliably and note that
there might exist even better objective functions.
Li et al. invented another detection method based on ob-
servation of the last-layer outputs of convolutional neural
networks [15]. They built a cascade classifier to detect un-
expected behaviours in this last layer.
There has also been research on using Bayesian methods
to estimate the level of uncertainty at dropouts and thus de-
tect adversarial samples [5] or applying transformations to
inputs to make detection easier [25].
All of the above-mentioned defences, however, have at
least one of two shortcomings. First, some require addi-
tional classifiers [18, 15], which means extra computation
when deploying the models. Second, some require restruc-
turing the original neural network [16, 17], which means
extra design complexity and a possible degradation of func-
tionality.
Our goal is to design a detection mechanism that requires
no additional classifiers, does not impair the network’s per-
formance in the absence of adversarial samples, and can de-
tect them dependably with almost zero computational over-
head.
3. Methodology
3.1. Adversarial Attacks
We decided to use the following attacks to evaluate the
taboo trap:
• Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [6];
• Iterative Method [12];
• Deepfool Method [19].
The fast gradient sign method (FGSM), introduced by
Goodfellow et al., creates perturbations using the sign of
the gradients of a DNN [6]. The iterative method (BIM) of
Kurakin et al. is an iterative version of this: adversarial sam-
ples are used as inputs to FGSM and accumulate perturba-
tions iteratively [12]. Deepfool, by Moosavi et al., is also an
iterative method. It aims to minimize the changes required
to push a DNN across decision boundaries, by iteratively
perturbing an input image and linearlizing the classification
space to move it to the closest decision boundary [19]. We
used the implementations of the attacks above from Fool-
box [22] and implemented our defense mechanism in Py-
torch [20].
At the time of writing, FGSM is generally considered
to be a weak adversary, BIM a slightly stronger one and
DeepFool the strongest attack.
3.2. The Taboo Trap
3.2.1 Behavioural Detection
Profile Train Deploy
Figure 1: A 3-stage detection pipeline.
The intuition behind the Taboo Trap is simple. We train
the DNN to have a restricted set of behaviours on activa-
tions that are hidden from the attackers during training, and
report any unexpected behaviour thereafter as an adversarial
sample.
We illustrate this as a three-stage process in Figure
1. We first profile activation values for all samples (N )
on the training dataset across different layers (L), A ⊂
RN×L×X×Y×C . Each Al,n is a three-dimensional tensor
which is a collection of feature maps, An,l ⊂ RX×Y×C ,
where X , Y and C are the feature map’s width, height and
number of channels respectively. To set a Taboo Trap, we
need to define a transform function ft on all activations.
During the training phase, we combine the output of the
transform function, considering only a batch of data (B):
L = LSGD + λ
B∑
n=1
ft(An) (1)
λ is a hyper-parameter and LSGD is the loss from
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD). In the third stage, the
output of ft(An) translates to the detection result:
Detected =
{
True, if ft(An) ≥ 0
False, otherwise
(2)
3.2.2 Using nth Percentile as Transform Function
In this section, we study one of the many possible trans-
form functions – the maximum percentile function. We will
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(a) Clean data (b) FGSM ( = 0.4) data
Figure 2: Predictive accuracy with different percentiles used with Max detector of ResNet18 on CIFAR10 dataset.
return to the discussion of what makes a good transform
function, and how to diversify them, in Section 5 on page 6.
Considering the activation values of each layer, we have
a collection of values, and for each layer l and sample n, we
have An,l ⊂ RX×Y×C , where X , Y and C are the feature
map’s width, height and number of channels respectively.
We usemaxA ⊂ RN×L to represent the profiled maximum
activations of N samples on L layers; effectively, maxAn,l
is a single value that is the maximum of An,l. For each
layer l, the profiled maximum activations of all samples on
the training dataset are represented as maxA[1:N ],l ⊂ RN .
The profiled maximum activation (maxA[1:N ],l) is a vector
of length N , where N is the number of samples. We first
calculate threshold value for a particular layer:
αl = g(maxA[1:N ],l) (3)
We design a function αl = g(maxA[1:N ],l) =
Percentilen(maxA[1:N ],l), where Percentilen computes the
nth percentile of the function input. We then perform fine-
tuning on the DNN with a regularizer that penalizes activa-
tions larger than the profiled thresholds. We then design the
transform function (ft) in the following form:
ft(An) =
λ
L−1∑
l=0
Xl−1∑
x=0
Yl−1∑
y=0
Cl−1∑
c=0
fp(An,l,x,y,c, αl)
(4)
We define fp to be:
fp(a, b) =
{
1, if a ≥ b
0, otherwise
(5)
In the second stage, we find the number of activations
in each layer that are over-excited and try to minimize their
values using SGD. The regularizer provides an extra loss to
the loss function of the neural network and λ is a hyper-
parameter used to control how hard we are penalizing the
neural network for having large activation values.
In the third phase, we use a detection function when we
deploy the model. For any given input n, we check the ac-
tivation values that the neural network produces at every
layer. If any of them is greater than the threshold value for
that particular layer, we recognize that particular input as
adversarial.
3.3. Networks and Datasets
We use LeNet5 [14] on MNIST [13]. The LeNet5 model
has 431K parameters and classifies MNIST hand-written
digits with an accuracy of 99.17%. For the CIFAR10 [10]
datasets, we use M-CifarNet [27] and ResNet18 [8] to per-
form classifications. The M-CifarNet classifier [27] has
1.3M parameters and achieves 89.48% classification accu-
racy, and our ResNet18 model achieves 93.83% accuracy
on CIFAR10 and 76.76% accuracy on CIFAR100.
4. Evaluation
4.1. Training, Detection and Classification trade-off
The additional loss introduced through the regularization
term makes training more challenging. First, even though
the network usually converges to the same accuracy in the
same number of epochs compared to the original network
without such regularization, the false positive rate remains
high. By this we refer to the number of images that are de-
tected as adversarial but are actually clean inputs. In order
to remove them, we need to train the network for a few more
additional epochs with a small learning rate and a large λ.
This effectively forces the weights to make sure they fall in
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LeNet5 (MNIST) fine-tuning
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(a) LeNet5 fine-tuned from a pretrained model.
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LeNet5 (MNIST) from scratch
Adversarial accuracy Detected
(b) LeNet5 trained from scratch.
Figure 3: LeNet5 Accuracy and detection rates on adversarial samples with regularization but different training strategies.
the expected range. Second, detection rates depend heav-
ily on how aggressive the thresholding values are; normally
more aggressive thresholds also indicate more fine-tuning
epochs. Intuitively, aggressive thresholds require weights
to adjust more to provide good detection performance.
To explore the performance / defence trade-off we
trained the networks from scratch (why, will be explained
in section 4.2) for the same number of epochs. Note, we did
not optimise the networks until their respective best perfor-
mance so we could explore the relative performance. Fig-
ure 2 on the previous page shows the predictive accuracy
of ResNet18 with different max-percentile thresholds each
trained for:
• Epochs 20, learning rate 0.1, alarm rate 5
• Epochs 20, learning rate 0.01, alarm rate 5
• Epochs 20, learning rate 0.01, alarm rate 100
We used the models that reported the lowest false posi-
tive rate and highest training accuracy between training it-
erations.
Figure 2a on the preceding page shows the performance
of the classifiers on clean data (y-axis, Accuracy) and per-
centage of the clean samples that were classified correctly
but actually raised the alarm (x-axis, False Positive Rate).
It can be seen that the networks with less aggressive thresh-
olds ended up having relatively large accuracy. More ag-
gressive thresholds indicate large regularization loss which
impacts training quality and produces larger false positive
rates. Similar behavior is observed for all of the networks
we trained.
Note that this section only focuses on analyzing the
trade-offs, and only has a limited number of epochs spent
on fine-tuning. For all of the networks used, we could train
them to near original accuracy and near zero false positive
rate.
4.2. Training From Scratch versus Fine-tuning
When training with a regularizer, there are two method-
ologies to consider. One is simply to train the network
again from scratch, and the other one is using the existing
pre-trained model as a starting point for fine-tuning. We
find that there is a big difference in detection rates between
the two. Figure 3a and Figure 3b show the performance of
LeNet5 when trained with the same hyperparameters, fine-
tuned and from scratch respectively.
It can be seen that the detection rates are significantly
larger with small FGSM  values.
Intuitively, when training the network with a large regu-
larizer, the weights have to optimize two losses – the reg-
ularization loss and the classification loss. For fine-tuning,
the former dominates the cost function thus the model strug-
gles to balance between the two losses and makes conver-
gence challenging. In contrast, when training from scratch,
the regulariser loss is so large that it provides heavy restric-
tions on the initialized weights. So we first see a quick drop
in regularization loss and the classification loss then starts
to decrease slowly. Ultimately, both processes can provide
similar performance, however, fine-tuning approaches are
restricted to a smaller set of regularization hyper-parameters
and it almost always reduce the large regularzation loss first
which completely destroys the classification accuracy and
gives no advantage over training from scratch.
In summary, we provide the training methodology of the
taboo trap in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Taboo trap instrumented training process
Data: α = Alarm Rate,  = Learning Rate, l = loss
Result: WTC instrumented network with comparable
performance
Pick initial values for Alarm Rate and Learning Rate;
while Detection Rate on test data > 0 do
Retrain with α and  and collect loss l for a
number of epochs.
if l is not decreasing then
Increase α
Decrease 
end
end
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θ Classifier Taboo Trap
R R D RE
None 0.94 0.95 0 0.02
FGSM
 = 0.02 0.15 0.6 0.01 0.08
 = 0.04 0.07 0.35 0.16 0.18
 = 0.06 0.03 0.14 0.68 0.74
 = 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.91 1
 = 0.1 0.01 0.06 0.92 1
 = 0.2 0.01 0.06 0.91 1
 = 0.4 0 0.05 0.92 1
 = 0.6 0 0.03 0.91 1
 = 0.8 0 0.02 0.92 1
 = 1.0 0 0.03 0.92 1
BIM
 = 0.07 0 0.01 0.94 0.97
 = 0.5 0 0.01 0.94 0.9
 = 1.0 0 0.01 0.94 0.9
DeepFool
i = 1 0.7 0.71 0.02 0.15
i = 3 0.15 0.4 0.03 0.46
i = 5 0.01 0.26 0.05 0.71
Table 1: The max nth percentile detector evaluation of
ResNet18 on CIFAR10 dataset next to an uninstrumented
ResNet18. R means the recovered accuracy on adversarial
samples, D means detection ratio on all adversarial sam-
ples and RE refers to the percentage of recovered adversar-
ial samples that raised the alarm.
4.3. Regularization Effect
Table 1 shows the performance of ResNet18 on the CI-
FAR10 dataset with and without taboo trap. By restricting
the distribution of activation values, one also gets better reg-
ularization and the base classifier becomes more resistant to
adversarial samples. The difference becomes apparent with
a strong DeepFool attack with 3 steps – 15% accuracy with-
out versus 40% with Taboo Trap. Additionally, taboo trap
now recognizes 25% more samples on the adversarial sam-
ples, and detected 44% of the adversarial samples that were
misclassified.
4.4. Max nth percentile detector evaluation
Table 2 shows the performance of the taboo trap against
three attackers with different levels of capabilities. The first
thing that becomes apparent is that all of the networks have
shown a good detection rate for FGSMs with a relatively
high . Interestingly, LeNet5 on MNIST and ResNet18 on
CIFAR10 have shown good recovered accuracy for small
values of , whereas M-CifarNet and ResNet18 on CI-
FAR100 have not. Both models have in common that they
try to solve a rather complex task with a much smaller ar-
chitecture capability. This suggests that finding reported in
Section 4.3 can be made even stronger given a more capable
architecture. The taboo trap shows a relatively weak perfor-
mance on a relatively strong attack (BIM) and a lot worse
performance against a strong attack (DeepFool). Similar to
FGSM, the performance of the detector was better in mod-
els with higher capacity for a given dataset.
To summarize, the nth percentile detector has shown rel-
atively good detection rates against weak attackers with the
rates decreasing as the attacks become stronger. Finally, the
detector’s performance and adversarial recovery effect ob-
served seems to be connected with the general capacity of
the chosen DNN to solve a given task.
5. Discussion
Layer	1,	Channel	1 Layer	1,	Channel	27 Layer	1,	Channel	44
Layer	3,	Channel	59 Layer	3,	Channel	66 Layer	3,	Channel	67
Figure 4: Visualization of pixels that the Taboo Trap re-
ported as over-excited. The underlying neural network is
M-CifarNet with FGSM ( = 0.8) attack.
What makes our work particularly important is that we
have presented a simple, low-cost way to defend networks
against GreyBox attacks, and a combination of transforms
and behaviour-level constraints may extend this protection
to BlackBox/WhiteBox attacks.
In 1883, the cryptographer Auguste Kerckhoffs enunci-
ated a design principle that has stood the test of time: a
system should withstand enemy capture, and in particular
it should remain secure if everyhing about it, except the
value of a key, becomes public knowledge [9]. Here, we
have studied the performance of using the nth maximum
percentile as a simple transform function. However, trans-
form functions could be any transformations on the acti-
vation values. This gives plenty of opportunity to add the
equivalent of a cryptographic key. In the GreyBox setup,
attackers might be aware of the deployment of the taboo
trap classifier but remain ignorant of the chosen transform
function. In a WhiteBox scenario, attackers might construct
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LeNet5 – MNIST M-CifarNet – CIFAR10 ResNet18 – CIFAR10 ResNet18 – CIFAR100
θ R D RE R D RE R D RE R D RE
No attack 0.99 0 0.02 0.89 0 0.02 0.95 0 0.02 0.75 0.03 0.06
FGSM
 = 0.02 0.9 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.6 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.02
 = 0.04 0.64 0.27 0.21 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.35 0.16 0.18 0.04 0.01 0.01
 = 0.06 0.32 0.52 0.45 0.01 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.68 0.74 0.02 0.01 0
 = 0.08 0.12 0.73 0.68 0.01 0.3 0.3 0.08 0.91 1 0.01 0.01 0.02
 = 0.1 0.05 0.88 0.84 0.01 0.64 0.72 0.06 0.92 1 0.01 0.01 0.01
 = 0.2 0 0.99 0.53 0 0.81 0.68 0.06 0.91 1 0 0.74 0.7
 = 0.4 0 0.99 0.1 0 0.81 0.53 0.05 0.92 1 0 0.75 0.2
 = 0.6 0 0.99 0.07 0 0.81 0.53 0.03 0.91 1 0 0.75 0.1
 = 0.8 0 0.99 0.07 0.01 0.81 0.65 0.02 0.92 1 0 0.75 0.1
 = 1.0 0 0.99 0.05 0.01 0.82 0.75 0.03 0.92 1 0 0.75 0.1
BIM
 = 0.07 0 0.63 0 0 0.79 0 0.01 0.94 0.97 0 0.18 0
 = 0.5 0 0.64 0 0 0.79 0 0.01 0.94 0.9 0 0.18 0
 = 1.0 0 0.64 0 0 0.79 0 0.01 0.94 0.9 0 0.18 0
DeepFool
i = 1 0.87 0.07 0.11 0.45 0.03 0.03 0.71 0.02 0.15 0.64 0.01 0.01
i = 3 0.1 0.13 0.21 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.4 0.03 0.46 0.18 0.01 0.01
i = 5 0 0.14 0.05 0 0.03 0 0.26 0.05 0.71 0.02 0.01 0
i = 7 0 0.14 0 0 0.03 0 0.2 0.07 0.82 0 0.01 0
i = 9 0 0.14 0 0 0.03 0 0.16 0.08 0.89 0 0.01 0
Table 2: The max n-th percentile detector evaluation of LeNet5 (MNIST), M-CifarNet (CIFAR10), ResNet18 (CIFAR10 and
CIFAR100). R means the recovered accuracy on adversarial samples, D means detection ratio on all adversarial samples and
RE refers to the percentage of recovered adversarial samples that raised the alarm.
Figure 5: Different transform functions for activations. f1 is the maximum 1st percentile, where the threshold α is different
for each layer since is per-layer profiling dependent. f2 is restricted to ([0 : 1]) and applied only on the first layer. f2 is
restricted to ([0 : 1], [2 : 3], [4 : 5]) and applied on all layers.
samples that trick the defence employed – they can try to
feed in various inputs to figure out the transform function.
One potential defence against WhiteBox attacks is chang-
ing the key – for example, to combine a series of transform
functions that work on conflicting ranges and rotate them
with their corresponding models at run-time. The MagNet
discussed the possibility of this; the Taboo Trap gives much
more scope to do it.
So how do we choose good keys? We have experimented
with a number of different transform functions and have ob-
served them exhibiting a variety of defensive capabilities.
In Figure 4 on the preceding page, we show a heatmap
Attack θ f1 f2 f3
FGSM  = 0.4 0.94 0.97 0.98
BIM  = 0.07, i = 5 0.94 0.92 0.61
DeepFool i = 5 0.01 0.12 0.06
Table 3: Performance of detector on LeNet5 (MNIST)
trained with three different transform functions: f1 and f3
apply on all layers; f2 only applies on the first layer.
on the over-threshold pixels on different adversarial sam-
ples. This helps us to evaluate the effectiveness of a trans-
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form function. We apply the attack on the evaluation dataset
to generate adversarial samples and record which pixels
are over-driven. The brighter the pixel is, the more often
this happened. On a particular transform function (max-
percentile), some channels show a large number of sensi-
tive pixels but some channels only show one or two. The
majority of the filters remain silent as the detector actually
mostly works on particular layers and even particular chan-
nels. However, those channels and layers can be hard to
identify unless the defense has been deployed and tested
against real adversarial samples.
To further demonstrate that behavioural defense can
work with different transform functions, Table 3 on the
previous page shows the defensive capabilities of LeNet5
(MNIST) trained with three different transform functions,
while Figure 5 on the preceding page shows the selected
three transform functions.
We conducted three experiments.
1. In the first, we apply the maximum percentile function
f1 on all layers.
2. The second applies f2 only on the first layer.
3. The third experiment is to apply f3 on all layers.
The functions, f1, f2, f3, are respectively max threshold
with 1st percentile of activation maximum; first layer only
restricted with an aggressive range of ([0, 1]); and all layers
restricted to ([0, 1], [2, 3], [4, 5]). All of the networks were
trained to have an accuracy of around 99% with a false
positive rate of around 1%. As can be seen in the table, the
performance of DeepFool against f1 is six times that of f3
and ten times that of f2.
Yet despite bad performance with f1, it has the best de-
tector performance against BIM. It is only marginally better
than f2, but is 1.5x better than f3. Poor performance against
BIM does not stop f3 from scoring best against FGSM. All
the functions present relatively good detection rates against
weak attacks, but show different levels of capability against
stronger ones. This suggests that each of the attacks focuses
on exploiting a particular layer within a particular range,
and so a defender can choose different families of transform
functions to block different adversaries.
As noted above, the heterogeneity of the potential de-
fensive transform functions offers a potential solution to the
white-box attack. A combination of diversity and hetero-
geneity makes defence unpredictable, in ways that the de-
fender can tune in response to both the expectation and the
experience of attacks. Using a key to select from among
different transform functions could also bring enough non-
determinism to grey-box attacks, when the transform func-
tions are known, but the parameters are not.
Detection can also be randomised. In our evaluation we
used the canonical binary detector – the sample is either
adversarial or not. One can make use a continuous function
instead, measure how confident we are(e.g. how far away
it is from the threshold in case of nth percentile function)
that a particular sample is adversarial, and respond in an
appropriate but non-deterministic way.
We have designed our taboo trap with a view to its being
deployed on low-cost hardware where computation may be
severely limited, for example by battery life, in such cases
the implementation needs a certain amount of care. One
way to save energy is use the detector per-layer and abort
computation when the detector fires. However, this might
introduce a timing side-channel where the implementation
detail makes this relevant.
Finally, nothing stops the defender from using classifiers
with taboo traps in conjunction with other strategies. As our
approach does not change the network structure or add any
other additional components to the pipeline it is easily com-
bined with other, more expensive, defensive systems like
MagNet [2] or SafetyNet [16].
6. Conclusion
In this paper we presented the Taboo Trap, a radically
new way to detect adversarial samples that is both simple
and cheap. Instead of learning a network’s behaviour, we re-
strict it during training so that it avoid certain taboo values,
whether taboo outputs or taboo activations of intermediate
layers, and use taboo violation to detect adversarial inputs.
We explored the trade-offs between the detectability and ag-
gressiveness of the resulting restrictions, and found that our
models show consistently dependable behaviour on a set of
common computer-vision benchmarks. We explained how
to train the instrumented networks and showed that the re-
sulting classifiers are still able to provide comparable per-
formance to the baseline models regardless of how complex
the models are.
The run-time compute overhead is close to zero, with the
only additional cost being a slight increase in the time taken
to train the network. We evaluated our simple mechanism
and showed that it performs well against a range of popular
attacks. The simple nth percentile transfer function that we
tested did not perform as well as more complex detection
mechanisms such as MagNet but still provides a very useful
tool in the defender’s armoury.
In addition to simplicity and low cost, the Taboo Trap
offers diversity in defence. It can be used with a wide va-
riety of transfer functions, which can perform much of the
same function that key material does in cryptographic sys-
tems: the security of a system need not reside in keeping
the basic design secret, but in the secrecy of parameters that
can be chosen at random for each implementation. This
opens the prospect of extending defences against adversar-
ial machine-learning attacks from black-box applications to
grey-box and even white-box adversaries.
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